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Title by Adverse Possession.
When a person is in possession of real property, ap-
parently exercising over it the rights of ownership, the
law presumes him to be its lawful owner, until evidence
arises which negatives this presuimption. This princi-
ple is ennunciated by Blackstone (2 Sharsw. Bi., 196),
and by many of the earlier New, York cases.
The law provides that when possession has continued
for a certain length of time and in a manner prescribed
by law, that the title to the property becomes vested in-
defeasibly in him who has fulfilled the conditions so
prescribed, as against the whole world, not excepting the
true owner.
The manner in which this possessory right, existing
by virtue of the presumption of law referred to by Black-
stone, may be ripened into an estate, although the en-
try may be a tortious one, is made definite and certain
in the statute-books of the different States, which,
taken together with the judicial interpretations of these
statutes, for that portion of the law usually consider-
ed under the head of Title by Adverse Possession.
The purpose of the law in allowing a title begin-
ning with mere possession to be perfected from suci a
begrinning, is to afford a safeguard from those hardships
and inconveniences certain to arise, were it permitted
to assert rights slept in long after that limit which
the law places to the time allowed for their enforcement
has passed.
It would be unjust and would resulT in the instabili-
ty of property rights, were owniers of land required, af-
ter the time limited by the statute, to produce evidence
of a valid holding, when such evidence might be difficult
or even impossible to procure.
The statute of limitations is so intimately connect-
ed with the subject of title by adverse possession, that
a brief inquiry into its history and objects may be per-
missible.
The first statute of limitations was enacted in the
reign of King James I. and was a substitute for a sta-
tu-te of King Henry VIII. , passed, as says Lord Coke,
with a view to impose vigilance upon him that was to
bring his action. "
That portion of the statute providing the time with-
in which an action must be brought for the recovery of
real property, goes upon the supposition that one hold-
ing a valid title to real estate will not refrain during
the time limited from enforcing it against one holding
possession in derogation of the true title. One of the
court, in La Trombois v. Jackson, 8 Cowan, 589 , in re-
marking upon the statute of limitations, says "But for
the intervention of the statute, there would be no end
to the revival of dormant and antiquated titles. "
It was a familiar saying that the statute of limi-
tations presumes the paymient of a debt or the fulfilment
of an obligation after a certain time has elapsed from
the accruing of the right to enforce such payment or ful-
filment. This idea in regard to the statute is not en-
titled to the respect with which it was formerly treated,
the courts now sustaining the theory that the statute is
one of repose, taking away the remedy for enforcement of
the right on grounds of public policy. (McCarthy v.
White, 8 A. Dec., 754.)
Considoring that part of the statute of limitations
which deals with the length of time in which an action
must be brought to recover real property, it was former-
ly the theory of the law that a conveyance had been giv-
en to the party in possession. This presumption of a
grant seems to have been one of those legal fictions, so
dear to common law judges, but seems to have been of no
particular importance, since, when the possession could
be accounted for consistently with the true title, no
presumption of a grant was allowed to arise. At the
present time the presunption of a grant does not enter
into the law of adverse possession. It is generally
held, with that good sense that is growing more and more
to be a characteristic of modern judicial decisions,
that the right to enforce the true title is barred on
the grounds of policy given above. The statute not only
bars the remedy but confers as secure a title as could be
given by grant. (Sherman v. Kane, 86 11. Y., 57). This
estate obtained is always a fee.
It must be understood that any abandonment of the
possession before The completion of the full period lim-
ited in the statute will prevent the statute from taking
effect, (52 M"e., 46), and this as well where the discon-
tinuance of the possession results from a re-entry by
the original owners as where it is the consequence of
abandonment by the disseisor. (Pedrick v. Searll, 5
Searg. & R., 240).
5The possession may be completed by the successive
holdings, for the full time, by persons, in priority,
whether of descent or purchase, with each other. (Doe
v. Campbell, 10 Johns., 471).
The relation of priority between successive holders,
it is held in Smith v. Chapin, 31 Conn., 530, may be
shown to have existed by virtue of a parol contract. The
case was one in which the property, to which a title by
adverse possession was sought to be established, had been
by mistake omitted from a written agreement between the
parties ; the court allowed evidence of a parol agree-
ment to be given, showing the intention to include in the
instrument the property in question, and was sustained
on appeal.
An adverse possession must commence with a wrongful
changing of the possession of the property from the true
owner to the party beginning such wrongful possession.
This tortious shifting of the possession from one party
to the other is called disseisin. Fr. Preston thus de-
finos the term : "It is the ouster of the rightful owner
of the seisin. It is the comnencement of a new title---
After a disseisin the person by whom the disseisin is
comitted has the seisin or estate and the person on whom
the injury is committed has only the right or title of
entry. "
To constitute such a disseisin as will change The
possession from the true owner to the disseisor, the pos-
session following the disseisin must be of such a nature
as to be wholly inconsistent with the possession of the
former owner. As the court says in the case of Worces-
ter v. Lord, 56 Me., 265 : "The possession must be hos-
tile and adverse in its character, importing a denial of
the owner's title in the property claimed ; otherwise,
however open, notorious, constant and long continued it
may be, the ovmer' s action will not be barred. " From
this it follows, that in order to create such a disseisin
as will shift the title from the true owner, the dis-
scisor must enter in his own name. If there is any
proof to show that he has entered, recognizing in any
way, by his acts or by his words, the superior title of
the true owner, or that of any other person, there can
be no disseisin. Prom this rule of law two others
naturally follow.
The first of them is : Since the possession must be
of such a nature, that by implication the title of the
true owner must be denied, as well as that of every one
besides the disseisor, his possession must be exclusive.
The second is : Such a disseisin as will shift the
title from the true owner to the disseisor must have been
made under some claim of title, otherwise the inference
would be a clear one, from the fact that no title was
asserted in the disseisor either by his acts or by his
express representations, that the possession is subordi-
nate to the ownership of some person other than the dis-
seisor.
The principle that the entry must be made under
some claim of right or title, is one that has its reason
in the very nature of an adverse possession, and in New
York the rule was ennunciated as early as 1806, in the
case of Brandt v. Ogden, I Johns. Rep., 157. Spencer,
J., in the opinion, stated that in order to bar the re-
covery of a plaintiff who has title, by a possession in
the defendant, strict proof has always been required, riot
only that the first possession was taken under a claim
hostile to the real owner but that such hostility has
existed on the part of the succeeding tenants.
With reference to the characteristics of an adverse
possession such as will bar the title of The true oymer,
the cases generally hold that it must be an actual, vis-
ible, notorious, distinct and hostile possession and
that it must be under some claim of title. The language
of the different cases, in describing the essential char-
acteristics of an adverse possession, though sometimes
apparently conflicting, seem to create in the mind the
same general impression as to what elements must be pres-
ent in order to constitute a valid adverse possession.
In the case of Cahill v. Palmer, 45 N. Y., at p.
584, the court refers to the fundamental qualities of an
adverse possession in these words : 'When the possession
is actual, exclusive, open and notorious under a claim
of title adverse to any and all others for the time pre-
scribed by statute, such possession establishes a title.
In Hawk v. Luseman, 6 Searg. & R., 21, the court
said, in reviewing a judgment founded on an instruction
to the jury, that an uninterrupted possession of lands
for the time limited by statute would give a title by
adverse possession : "The act of limitations does not
prevent an entry of the owner of the land and the bring-
ing of an ejectment at any time, unless there has been
an actual, continued, visible, notorious, distinct and
hostile possession for the time limited in the statute.
In the case of v. Proprietors of Canals
9and Locks, 5 letc., at p. 33, the court holds : "Adverse
possession without right, constitutes a disseisin, pro-
vided the possession be notorious and exclusive",- the
word disseisin bein,' here employed in the sense of such
an ouster of the true owner as will be a good beginning
of an adverse possession.
In the case of Turney v. Chamberlain, 15 Ill., 271,
it is laid down as well settled law : "To constitute an
adverse possession, sufficient to defeat the right of
action of the party who has the legal title, the posses-
sion must be hostile in its inception, and so continue
for a period of twenty years. It must be an actual,
visible and exclusive possession, acquired and retained
under a claim of title inconsistent with that of the true
owner-"
The rule in Cahill v. Palmer, 45 N. Y., 484, has
been acted upon and affirmed in New York as laTe as 1888,
in the case of Buttery v. Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg
R. R. o., 14 N. Y. S. R., 131, where the court specify
as the ingredients of a good title by adverse possession,
the following : 'The possession must be under a claim of
title, evinced by acts open, notorious and consistent
only with such claim, exclusive of every other right, and
continuous. "
From these general statements of the same thing, it
is possible to formulate certain principles which will
express more fully the nature of an adverse possession.
An eminent authority on the law of real property,
Mr. Washburn, has classified the tests to be applied in
judging, of the validity of a title by adverse possession,
by supgesting that the chief things to be considered are
First, the actual occupancy, its notoriety and capability
of being clearly defined : Second, its continuity, hos-
tility and exclusiveness during the whole period limited
by the statute : Third, the intention with which the en-
try was made and the possession begun.
In some of the states it is provided in the statute
limiting the time within which an action may be brought,
that those commencing a possession under a claim of ti-
tle based upon a written instrument may be in construc-
tive possession of the whole tract described in such a
written instrument, although the actual occupation ex-
tends to but a very insignificant portion of the whole
tract ; while on the other hand, a person entering under
a claim of right not based upon a deed or other color of
title is generally allowed to assert a title by adverse
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possession to so much of the tract as has been occupied
actually by him.
A fair sample of such a statute is that of New York,
which enacts : uWhere the occupant, or those under whiom
he claims, entered into possession of the premises under
claim of title, founded upon a written instrument as be-
ing a conveyance of the premises in question, or upon the
decree or judgment of a competent court, and there has
been a continued occupation for more than twenty years,
the property is deemed to have been held adversely."
C. C. Pro., Sec. 369.
The next section of the statute provides that one
so claiming to hold under a deed, judgment or decree, is
deemed to hold property adversely when it has been usual-
ly cultivated or improved, when it has been substantially
enclosed, and, even if not cultivated or enclosed, it
has been used for supplying fuel, fencing, 'ausbandry, or
ordinarily by the occupant. A mown farm or lot, part-
ly occupied in actuality, is deemed to be adversely held,
when entry has been made under color of title.
On tho other hand the statute provides that 7,! ere
a claim,, of right, not founded upon a written instrument,
is made, adverse possession is deemed -o arise viith ref-
erence to that property alone, which is either substan-
tially enclosed or cultivated to the extent of what is
usual in that section of the State where the land is
situated.
Under that section of the statute allowing construc-
tive possession to arise in favor of one claiming under
a w.riten instrument, it has been held that where such a
constructive possession is sought to be established over
a parcel of land, part of which is in the actual posses-
sion of the claimant, that the unoccupied portion must
be in subservience to or actually comected with the
occupied part.
The language of the statute in requiring the con-
structive possession to be of a Unown fain or lot" would
seem sufficiently clear on this point.
In the case of Thompson v. Burhans, 79 1i. Y. , 93,
the plaintiff sought to establish his title to certain
lands, part of which adjoining lands iii actual occupa-
tion, but unenclosed, and not part of any "Imoyn lot or
farm", were admittedly wild arid in a state of nature.
The plaintiff had cut timber from this portion of the
tract, and had, on hearing of an intention to contest
his title, built thereon a log cabin and stayed there
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for a few weeks. The court held that no such possession
was shonm as entitled him to a recovery.
In order t}at the case may be brought within the
sections relating to constructive possession, the deed
or other written instrument must include in the descrip-
tion the whole of the premises claimed. This is held
in Jackson ex dem. ---- Gilliland v. Woodruff, .. .._ ,
and the reason given is that unless the premises are de-
scribed in the deed, it cannot be ascertained how far
the claim extends. There is, in fact, in such a case
to that part of -&he premises not covered in the descrip-
tion, and can be no valid possession without it.
The words "substantial enclosure" were held to mean,
in the case of Bolton v. Schriver, 49 Jones & Spencer,
to be such an enclosure as to give notice to the world
that the property was claimed exclusively, the court
intimatinr that its sufficiency would vary greatly with
the situation of the property.
As distinguished from the constructive occupation
of land claimed tnder a deed or written instrument, a
much greater degree of use of the land is required in
order to constitute a valid possession where ,he claim
made is not under color of title. This has been brief-
lyN stated above. In Miller v. Downing, 54 1'. Y., 631,
the plaintiff did, it is true, claim under color of ti-
tle, but did not seek to establish a constructive pos-
session of any part of the lot, and an actual occupation
was a necessary elernoet of his case. The acts of having
erected a wood-pile upon his premises for the space of
two years, and of having buried potatoes upon them for
six years, were held insufficient to establish a title
in him.
The possession must be conenced under such cir-
cumstances as will either proclaim to the true owner ex-
plicitly that his property is claimed adversely to him,
or will by their hostility, openess and general notoriety
raise a presumption that notice has been received by him.
An early Massachusetts case states a proposition
from which the above stated rule may be deduced. "It
is presumed that any entry is permissive until The con-
trary is made to appear." That is to say, that it must
be proven, to establish a title by adverse possession,
that the entry was not by consent of,and in subservience
to the title of ,the true owmer.
That the possession must be continuous t nroughout
the period prescribed by the statute of limitations,
and that it must be exclusive of all other claims to
The property, has already been briefly touched upon in
a for-er part of this essay.
The requiremenTs of hostility o the true title
and of exclusiveness of claim seem to be so allied ,,ith
each other that the definition of one seems to be also
a description of the other.
It is a rule, deep-rooted in the law of a-dverse pos-
session, that the possession, in order to be adverse,
must be hostile to the true owner in its inception. This
rule is closely connected with that making it necessary
that the possession of the claimant should be notorious.
To allow a claimant to gain an adverse possession of
land, while apparently acknowledging,by his acquiescence
therein, the superior authority of the true orner, and
exhibiting none of Thr indicia of ownership, would be to
open the way to fraud of a kind difficult to expose.
To avoid injustice and wrong of this sort, this
rule denanding hostility and exclusiveness has always
been recogpaized as one of the cardinal requirements of
a title by adverse possession. Chief Justice Iarshall,
delivering ,he opinion in -he case of Kirk v. Smirch, D
17heat. , 241-288, said : "It would shock that sense of
right which must be equally felt by legislatiors and
judges, if a possession which was permissive and entirely
consistent with the title of another should silently bar
t.ie title. ----- Such a construction would make the sta-
tute of limitations a statute for the encouragement of
fraud, a statute to enable one man to steal the title
of another by professing to hold under it. No laws ad-
mit of such a construction. "
The possession, therefore, of a cestui que trust,
a tenant against a lessor, or of one tenant in common
as against that of another, is always presumed to be in
subordination to that of the true owner, since the law
presumes that where an entry is made not under a claim
of title hostile to that of the true owner, such entry
is under and in subservience to the true title. (Jack-
son v. Thomas, 16 Johns., 292.)
A possession thus rightfully begun can never initiate
a right that may be perfected into a title, unless some
express disclaimer of the relationship is made or such
continued, open and notorious acts are done as will be
presumed to inform The true owner and the world that the
occupant claims to hold in his on right. (Zeller's
Lessee v. Eckert, 4 T'oward, U. S. , 289.)
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To illustrate the extent to which a trustee may re-
pudiate his trust and his powers and duties under it, in
the case of Zeller's Lessee v. Yckert, supra, the court
upheld a verdict based on the charge of the trial judge,
"that a trustee of any description may disavow and dis-
claim his trust though it is in the utmost bad faith or
in violation of his express agreement, from which time
his possession of lands becomes adverse. ----- It matters
not whether the trust began by the voluntary act of the
trustee or the law made him a trustee against his will
as the result of his situation or conduct. The charge
of the trial court is to be found in Tyler on Ejectments,
at p. 877, and is not found in full in the volume of re-
ports.
Whether the Supreme Court can be held to have af-
firmed such a doctrine as that the trustee in a trust
raised by implication of law out of a situation arising
from his own fraud, may disclaim such a trust and begin
an adverse possession of its subject matters, is extreme-
ly doubtful. The court say expressly that they con-
sider some of the criticisms of the charge by appellant's
counsel are justified, but that considering Ahe main
ground upon which bhe case was given to the jury, the
appellate court has no right to interfere. Judge Nel-
son, in the course of the opinion, states that the only
difference between cases in which the relationship of
privity arises and those in whic') it does not, is in the
greater accuracy of proof required to prove an adverse
possession under the former circunstances.
Parallel with the rule just discussed, is tht; re-
quiring the possession to be exclusive in the claimant
of a title by adverse possession. It has been said al-
ready that the general doctrine is that the possession
will not be deemed to be adverse, unless -he claim made
asserts the title to be in the occupant, exclusive of any
other right in any other person. (Livingston v. Peru
Iron Co., 9 W:,end., b1l.)
In addition to the necessity of hostility, notoriety
and exclusiveness, there must be present a continuity of
possession for the whole period prescribed hy the statute.
One of the chief facts required as an element of a title
by adverse possession being the ouster of the true ovmer,
when this is continued for the whole period limited by
statute, a satisfactory degree of continuity is obtained.
The possession need not be continued by the same
occupant, as has been stated, but where i-b is so fulfil-
led by succeeding occupants privity must exist between
them.
It is universally Vie doctrino of T1he courts that
where the entry is not made under some claim of title,
no adverse possession can arise ; for were the entry made
without an assertion of right in the party entoring, both
the presumption of la, and the com-on sense interpreta-
tion of the proceeding would be that The possession of
the land was merely in subservience to the title of The
true o wn er.
The presumption of law that makes the actual occu-
pant of land the owner until the contrary appears, will,
it has been stated, be destroyed by the lack of evidence
of a claim of title. The quo animo,- the intent with
which a possession is taken has been said to be one of
the tests by which a title by adverse possession is
judged. The claim under which entry was made furnishes
the best evidence of the intention with which The land
was taken.
There seems to be no doubt that it is wholly inua-
terial whether or not the title of v'hich claim is made
is a valid or invalid one.
A claim made under an instrument which is entirely
void as a conveyance in se will be sufficient to com-
mence an adverse possession.
In Hilton v. Bender, 2 Hurt, 1, a defendant, sued in
ejectment, claimed under a tax deed, given upon an assess-
ment sale, and it was held that a possession so begun
was such as would ripen in twenty years into a perfect
title.
As to whether it is necessary that good faith should
exist on the part of the occupant in making his entry, it
has been held in the case of Huibert v. Trinity Churrh,
that where a claim was founded upon an instrument, frau-
dulently procured by the defendants to be made indefi-
nite as to the boundaries, with the intent of encroach-
ing over them upon the adjoining land, and where the
facts had been fraudulently concealed from the true own-
ers of the land invaded, for many years, that, neverthe-
less, such bad faith in making the claim did not invali-
date the title by adverse possession. Ignorance by a
plaintiff of his wrong, even though caused by fraud, is
not material, and the court so held in the same case,
the reason being, that fraud is not one of the bars which
prevent the running of the statute and are named in it.
Statutes exist in most of 'he states wvhich declare
void deeds bv owners of land conveying property held
adversely by others than the true owner. They are fgen-
erally odelled after an ancient statute of Henry VIII.,
stated by Coke to be for "the avoiding of maintenance,
suppressing of right and stirring up of suits.
In one or two of the states, notably Massachusetts,
it has been held that this ancient statute is a part of
the common law and that chanpertous conveyances are void
even when there is no local statute so declaring them.
In the case of Crary v. Goodman, 22 1. Y., 170, the
distinction between the objects of the statutes of cham-
perty and of limitations was pointed out by the court.
The for-er, it says, is not, like the latter, a mere
statute of repose, intended to prescribe a limit to con-
troversies, but to prevent the transfer of disputed ti-
tles. The case was one where possession was taken by
mistaken encroachment over a boundary line. The court
said that though tie adverse possession was sufficient
to have barred the real owner from ejecting the occupant,
yet that a deed of the premises would not be avoided,
since a specific claim was shown by the language of The
statute to be necessary for that purpose.

